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Abstract:   
We estimate structural models of guilt aversion to measure the population level of 
willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid feeling guilt by letting down another player. We 
compare estimates of WTP under the assumption that higher-order beliefs are in 
equilibrium (i.e. consistent with the choice distribution) with models estimated using 
stated beliefs which relax the equilibrium requirement. We estimate WTP in the later 
case by allowing stated beliefs to be correlated with guilt aversion, thus controlling for a 
possible source of a consensus effect. All models are estimated using data from an 
experiment of proposal and response conducted with a large and representative sample 
of the Dutch population. Our range of estimates suggests that responders are willing to 
pay between 0.40 and 0.80 Euro to avoid letting down proposers by 1 Euro. 
Furthermore, we find that WTP estimated using stated beliefs is substantially 
overestimated (by a factor of two) when correlation between preferences and beliefs is 
not controlled for. Finally, we find no evidence that WTP is significantly related to the 
observable socio-economic characteristics of players. 
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1 Introduction
Persistent ndings in experimental economics suggest that in many strategic environments
people's preferences do not only depend upon the strategies played but also on the beliefs
they hold about other people's intentions and expectations (see e.g. Falk, Fehr, and Fis-
chbacher, 2008; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006). One specic type of belief-dependent
preferences which has received a lot of attention recently is guilt aversion (Charness and
Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007; Vanberg, 2008; Ellingsen, Johannes-
son, Tjtta, and Torsvik, 2009). In that literature an individual is dened as guilt averse
if he values living up to his expectations of what other individuals expect of him. Not
doing so causes a feeling of guilt which negatively aects the individual's utility and thus
inuences decision making.
The aim of this paper is to estimate structural models of guilt aversion to measure
the level of willingness to pay (WTP) in the Dutch population to avoid feeling guilty.1
Existing works test for the presence of guilt aversion by measuring the correlation between
players' decisions and their second-order beliefs: their expectations of what others expect
of them. The estimated correlations typically suggest signicant guilt aversion in student
populations (e.g. Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006). While such tests provide indications
of the relevance of guilt aversion, they provide little information concerning the quan-
titative importance of guilt aversion relative to self-interest. Measuring WTP thus has
the potential to provide new insights on the quantitative importance of guilt aversion for
players.
To proceed, we conducted an experiment with a large and representative sample of
the Dutch population. The experiment was based on a simple sequential two player game
of proposal and response with two additional inactive players. In the main treatment
(henceforth treatment S) responders made their decisions and were then asked to state
1Hence, this paper relates to recent attempts to measure population parameters using controlled
experiments as opposed to parameters characterizing student populations (see eg. Bellemare, Kroger,
and van Soest, 2008).
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their second-order beliefs: their expectations of the rst-order beliefs of proposers.
Measuring WTP using stated second-order beliefs and decisions from treatment S
raises some important issues. In particular, it has recently been argued that observing a
signicant correlation between responders' decisions and their stated second-order beliefs
does not necessarily imply guilt aversion (see Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg,
2008; Ellingsen, Johannesson, Tjtta, and Torsvik, 2009). The observed correlation may
instead reect a consensus eect which occurs when individuals condition on their behavior
(and preferences) when stating their beliefs (Ross, Greene and House, 1977).2 This eect
has been thoroughly studied in psychology. For our simple game it means that responders'
stated second-order beliefs are aected by their intended decisions rather than vice-versa.
We address these issues by jointly modeling decisions and stated second-order beliefs of
players in treatment S, allowing for correlation between guilt aversion and stated beliefs.3
We use our estimated model to quantify how much of the estimated WTP is due to
genuine guilt aversion, and how much is due to correlation between preferences and stated
beliefs. Furthermore, we compare our estimates of WTP obtained using stated beliefs
with those obtained using decisions and beliefs in treatment X. Treatment X is identical
to treatment S except that responders where informed about the true rst-order beliefs of
proposers before they made their decisions. Hence, second-order beliefs and preferences of
responders in treatment X are uncorrelated by design.4 The comparison of our estimates
in treatment S with those of treatment X will provide further indication of the possible
bias in estimated WTP which results from correlation between preferences and stated
2We will call it a consensus eect although in the original denition Ross, Greene and House (1977)
speak of a false consensus eect. Dawes (1989, 1990) argues that the label false is not justied because
the eect can be rationalized in a Bayesian framework. Engelmann and Strobel (2000) experimentally
investigate this issue and found clear evidence against the falsity. For our purpose this distinction is
however secondary.
3A similar econometric approach was followed by Bellemare, Kroger, and van Soest (2008). There,
they estimate a structural model of choice under uncertainty using ultimatum game data where beliefs
are allowed to be correlated with inequity averse preferences.
4Ellingson, Johannesson, Tjtta, and Torsvik (2009) used a similar method.
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beliefs.
In the nal part of the paper we estimate WTP assuming that beliefs are consistent
with the relevant choice distributions. This equilibrium approach is especially appealing
for two reasons. First, it is rmly grounded in theory (see e.g. Harsanyi 1967, Battigalli
and Dufwenberg, 2007 and Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009).5 Second, the consistency
requirement closes the model and thus circumvents the need to collect data on (higher-
order) beliefs. As a result, the equilibrium approach avoids possible biases due to consen-
sus eects which arise when using stated beliefs. Obviously, one potential drawback of
the equilibrium approach is that the consistency of decisions and beliefs may be an overly
restrictive assumption in one shot games as players do not have any opportunity to learn
about the expectations of others. In fact, we will show that the assumption that beliefs
are in equilibrium appears to be rejected by the data. Hence, our goal is to investigate
whether the equilibrium model can nevertheless provide reasonable estimates of WTP as
a rst approximation.
Our main results are the following. First, we nd that the estimated WTP is signi-
cantly higher (by a factor of 2) in treatment S than in treatment X when we do not control
for correlation between stated beliefs and preferences in treatment S. However, the esti-
mated WTP using stated beliefs is substantially smaller (but remains signicant) once
controlling for this correlation. In fact, controlling for correlation between preferences
and beliefs produces estimates of WTP in treatment S which are closer in magnitude and
insignicantly dierent from the level of WTP estimated in treatment X. These result
suggest that ignoring correlation between preferences and beliefs can result in important
overestimation of WTP when using stated beliefs. Second, our range of estimates suggests
that responders are on average willing to pay between 0.40 Euro and 0.80 Euro to avoid
letting down proposers by 1 Euro. Third, the WTP estimated under the assumption that
5Theoretical models of guilt aversion do not necessary require that beliefs be in equilibrium to generate
predictions about behavior. Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) for example also analyze strategic behavior
in psychological games under the weaker requirement that beliefs are rationalizable. See their section 5.2
for a discussion.
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beliefs are in equilibrium is signicant and falls within this range of estimates. Fourth, we
do not nd that WTP to avoid letting down any player varies signicantly across various
socio-economic dimensions (age, education, income, etc.).6 Finally, we nd no evidence
that second movers are willing to pay to avoid letting down inactive players. This result
holds for both the stated and equilibrium belief models.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we describe the game and
experimental setup. In section 3 we present our data. Section 4 presents a model of
simple guilt. Section 5 presents our econometric model using stated beliefs while section
6 presents our econometric model assuming equilibrium beliefs. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Game and the Experimental Setup
The experiment was conducted via the CentERpanel, an Internet survey panel managed
by CentERdata at Tilburg University. The panel consists of about 4000 households, a
representative sample of the Dutch population. Households are contacted every Friday
and are asked to answer several questions. Members of each household have until Sunday
night to respond. Most of these questions are survey questions about household decisions
but CentERdata also allows for simple interactive experiments.7 Our experiment is based
on the following game:
6Recent experimental studies sampling the same population (Bellemare and Kroger, 2007;, Belle-
mare, Kroger, and van Soest, 2008) have on the other hand found that distributional preferences vary
signicantly across socio-economic dimensions.
7For more details and a description of the recruitment, sampling methods, and past usages of the
CentERpanel see: www.centerdata.nl. Computer screens from the original experiment (in Dutch) with
translations are available upon request.
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yC(r)
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xA(R)
xB(R)
xC(R)
xD(R)
In this simple sequential game, there are four players: A, B, C and D. Player A can
choose either the outside option R or he can choose L to let player B decide. If player A
chooses R then the game ends and the players receive their payos xA(R), xB(R), xC(R)
and xD(R), respectively. If player A decides to choose L then player B has to choose
either l or r. In both cases the game ends and the players receive their corresponding
payos, either yA(l), yB(l), yC(l) and yD(l), respectively or yA(r), yB(r), yC(r) and yD(r),
respectively.
Players C and D are dummy players whose monetary payos are determined by the
choices of player A and (possibly) B.8 We included C and D players to analyze how
B's decision is aected by the presence of strategically uninvolved players. The existing
literature (e.g. Guth and Van Damme, 1998; Kagel and Wolfe, 2001) indicates that the
presence of one inactive player has a weak inuence of behavior in simple games. Here,
we use two inactive players in order to make their presence in the game more salient.
Payos were systematically varied across games with the help of Optimal Design Theory
(see Mueller and Ponce de Leon, 1996). Payos were presented in CentERpoints - the
currency that is usually used in experiments conducted with the CentERpanel. In total
8Our game is similar to that analyzed by Charness and Rabin (2005) with the dierence that we
include the dummy players C and D. Furthermore, contrary to them, A players in our experiment could
not communicate to B players their preferences over the possible choices of B players.
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we invited 3000 panel members to participate for both treatments. From all invited
participants, 1962 responded and went through the whole experiment. We next describe
both treatments of our experiment in detail.
Treatment S
Treatment S was conducted at the beginning of 2007. We invited 2000 CentERpanel
members to participate in this treatment. 1666 out of the 2000 invited panel members
responded to the invitation by reading the opening screens of the experiment. They
were provided with a description of the game, the possible choices that players in the
dierent roles could make and their associated consequences. Before the revelation of
their roles and monetary payos, members were given the chance to resign from the
experiment. 264 members resigned at this stage, leaving us with 1402 members who
where then randomly assigned to a specic game and to one of the four dierent roles
A, B, C and D. Following the information about their role and their game's payos,
participants were asked to make their choices. We used the strategy method (see Selten
1967). This means that A and B players made their decisions separately, which B players
asked to make a decision conditional on player A choosing L. This helped us overcome
the problems of coordinating interactions in real time via the panel.
After making their decision, A players was asked to state their rst-order beliefs con-
cerning the behavior of player B if they chose to let this player decide the nal allocation.9
In particular, A players were presented the following question
(First-order beliefs of A players) What do you think, how many B-Persons out of 100 will
choose l and how many r. Please indicate this number for each possible allocation.
1. Number of B Persons out of 100 that will choose B.1 : XA
2. Number of B Persons out of 100 that will choose B.2 : Y A
9 Asking beliefs after their decisions implies that the later are unaected by the belief elicitation. As
a result, we are able to use the decisions of B players in treatment S to estimate the equilibrium model
presented in Section 6.
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The computer program automatically ensured that the numbers entered (XA+Y A) added
up to 100. To simplify the task of participants, all beliefs were elicited using natural
frequencies.10
After their decisions (l or r), B players were asked to state their second-order beliefs.
In particular, they were asked to answer the following question:
(Second-order beliefs of B players) What do you think about Person A's beliefs about the
behavior of Persons B? Please indicate this number for each possible allocation.
1. Person A believes that XB B-Persons out of 100 choose B.1
2. Person A believes that Y B B Persons out of 100 choose B.2
Again, the computer program automatically ensured that the numbers XB + Y B added
up to 100.11 We did not pay players for accuracy of their beliefs.12
The decisions of A and B players were matched after the experiment to determine
the nal payo of all players. Before the experiment participants were informed that we
expect at most 2000 persons to participate and 50 played games (50 players of each role)
would be paid.13 In order to increase the number of B-player decisions which were most
interesting for us, we put more persons into the role of B than into the other roles. More
10This follows Horage, Lindsey, Hertwig, and Gigerenzer (2000) who found that people are better at
working with natural frequencies than with percent probabilities.
11Our elicitation procedure elicits a single point of the subjective distribution of the beliefs of B
players. There is uncertainty over the interpretation of these point estimates. Recent research suggests
that respondents may interpret dierently the belief question. As a result, they may report dierent
points (eg. means, medians, modes) of their subjective distribution. See Manski (2004) for a recent
review.
12Several studies have found that rewarding subjects for the accuracy of their expectations using
an incentive compatible scoring rule does not produce signicantly dierent elicited expectations; see
Friedman and Massaro (1998) and Sonnemans and Oerman (2001).
13The experiment was conducted using CentERpoints, the usual currency for CentERpanel members.
For the sake of simplicity we state directly the amounts in Euro. The exchange-rate was 100 CentERpoints
= 1 e.
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specically, we had prepared 1600 payo-wise dierent games for treatment S. Given these
1600 games, we decided a priori to randomly allocate each of our initial 2000 invited panel
members to one of the four roles in the following proportions: 1600 B player roles (one for
each game), 300 A players, 50 C players, and 50 D-players. We randomly picked 50 out
of the 300 games consisting of A and a B players to which we assigned C and D players.
This means, we a priori randomly picked 50 payo-wise dierent games (out of 1600)
and paid all players in those selected games. Hence, in the beginning of the experiment
participants were randomly allocated to a specic role and a game ensuring that a-priori
everybody had an equal chance to be in a game which was paid o at the end (for
details see also the translated screens of the experiment in the appendix). As announced
before the experiment, participants of the games that were paid out received information
on the outcome of their game and their nal payos a few weeks after the experiment.
Furthermore, the corresponding amounts were credited to their bank accounts. Of the
1402 participants that completed the experiment there were 1114 B players, 214 A players
and 74 C and D players.14
Treatment X
Treatment X was conducted during the summer of 2008. For this treatment, we (i) selected
all 214 games in treatment S with decisions and stated rst-order beliefs of A players, (ii)
we re-contacted the A, C and D players who had played these specic games and asked
them whether we could use their decisions and beliefs (if any) for a follow-up experiment
and (iii) invited 1000 new members of the CentERpanel to participate in the experiment.
Note, in order to avoid any deception, all A, C and D players that were recontacted
were given the possibility to decline, preventing us to use their decisions and beliefs. No
player declined our request. Furthermore, 719 out of the 1000 new invited panel members
responded to the invitation by reading the opening screens of the experiment. As in
14Table 1 presents data from treatment S. As can be seen, the sample size of treatment S is N=1078.
1078 represents the number of B players (out of the 1114) for whom we had a complete record of
background characteristics.
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treatment S, they were given the chance to resign from the experiment after the structure
of the game was explained but before they learned their role and the detailed payos.
159 members resigned at this stage, leaving us with 560 new members who where then all
assigned to the role of player B and confronted with their specic game.15 In contrast to
treatment S, the B players in treatment X were not asked for their second-order beliefs but
were presented the rst-order beliefs of their matched A player (taken from treatment S)
before making their decisions. All other features of the treatment are otherwise identical
to treatment S. We informed participants before the experiment that 25 games played
were going to be randomly selected and paid. As before the subjects received information
about the decisions a few weeks later and for the players of the selected games including
A, C and D players the corresponding amounts were credited to their bank account.
3 Data
Table 1 presents the sample means and standard deviations of the allocations to A, B, C,
and D players at the three end nodes of the game. The average allocation ranges between
20 and 25 Euros per player depending on the role and the terminal node.
First-order beliefs of A players were elicited in treatment S and are provided to B-
players in treatment X. We analyze the rst-order beliefs of A players in treatment S by
estimating the following linear regression
bAi = 0 + 1y
A
i + 2y
B
i + 3y
C
i + 4y
D
i + i (1)
where bAi denotes the stated probability of player A on player B playing r (rst-order
beliefs of player A), and where yki = y
k
i (r)   yki (l) denotes the payo dierence when
player B chooses r relative to l for player k 2 fA;B;C;Dg. The estimated equation is
15Hence the 214 games were used on average more than twice. Table 1 presents data from treatment
X. The sample size of treatment X is N=540. Analogous to treatment S, 540 represents the number of
B players (out of the 560) for whom we had a complete record of background characteristics.
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the following (with robust standard errors in parenthesis)
bbAi = 0:473
(0:019)
+ 0:001
(0:001)
yAi + 0:006

(0:001)
yBi + 0:001
(0:001)
yCi + 0:000
(0:000)
yDi
We nd that A players expect that B players are more likely to choose r the more B players
can benet from this choice. Interestingly, rst-order beliefs do not vary signicantly with
payos of other players. This suggests that A players do not expect that B players will
take into account the well being of other players when making their decisions.
We next investigated whether stated expectations of A and B players are rational, that
is consistent with observable outcomes. We rst compared the stated rst-order beliefs
of A players with the realized choice probabilities of B players. To compute the later, let
pi denote the vector of payos dierences (ie. y
k
i ) of all players involved in the game
played by the i'th player A. Furthermore, let bAi denote player A's subjective probability
that player B will chose to play r. We estimated nonparametrically Pr(c = rjpi) for
each player A, where Pr(c = rjpi) denotes the probability that B players choose r given
pi.
16 We then computed bAi   cPr(c = rjpi) for each player A, that is the dierence
between the stated rst-order beliefs of player A and the corresponding estimated choice
probability of B players in the game played by i. The left hand graph of Figure 1 plots the
distribution of dierences for all A players in treatment S. Rational expectations would
imply a distribution concentrated around zero. We nd substantial deviations, suggesting
that expectations of A players are far from consistent with the observed choice behavior.
We next compared the stated second-order beliefs of each B player in treatment S
(denoted b
A
i ) with the expected rst-order beliefs of A players. To compute the later,
we estimated nonparametrically E(bAi jpi) for each B player, where E(bAi jpi) denotes the
objective expected rst-order beliefs of A players given the game played by the i'th player
B. We then computed b
A
i   bE(bAi jpi) for each i. The right hand graph of Figure 1
presents the deviations for all B players in treatment S. Rational expectations would
again imply that this distribution would be concentrated around zero. However, we also
16All nonparametric regressions use the Nadaraya-Watson estimator with gaussian kernel. See Li and
Racine (2007) for a recent review of these methods.
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nd substantial deviations, suggesting that stated second-order beliefs of B players are
also inconsistent with the observed rst-order beliefs of A players.
4 A model of simple guilt aversion
In this section, we specify a structural econometric model of guilt version. Our starting
point is the model of `simple guilt' proposed by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007).17 We
start by assuming that the utility of of choosing r for player B is given by
Ui(r) = y
B
i (r) + 
A
i G
A
i (r) + 
CD
i G
CD
i (r) (2)
where yBi (r) denotes his payo, G
A
i (r) denotes guilt towards player A (conditional on
player A's beliefs), and where GCDi (r) denotes guilt towards players (C;D) (conditional
on players C and D's beliefs). Player B's utility of choosing l is dened analogously and
is omitted for brevity.
The parameter Ai controls player B's sensitivity to guilt towards player A. Similarly,
CDi controls player B's sensitivity to guilt towards players (C;D). Note, as marginal
utility of own income yBi is normalized to 1, the (absolute) values of 
A
i and 
CD
i also rep-
resent player B's willingness to pay to avoid letting down A and C;D players respectively
by 1 CentERpoint.
The guilt variables from choosing r are dened as
GAi (r) =

E
 
Y Ai
  yAi (r) 1 yAi (r) < yAi (l) (3)
GCDi (r) =

E
 
Y CDi
  yCDi (r) 1 yCDi (r) < yCDi (l) (4)
where E
 
Y Ai

denotes the expected payo of player A, where yCDi (n)  yCi (n)+yDi (n) for
n 2 fl; rg, and where E  Y CDi  denotes the expectation of the sum of payos of players
17Note, Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) also present an extended model of `guilt from blame' which
assumes that a player cares about others inferences regarding the extent to which he is willing to let
down.
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C and D.18 These expectations are given by
E
 
Y Ai

= bAi y
A
i (r) + (1  bAi )yAi (l) (5)
= bAi

yAi (r)  yAi (l)

+ yAi (l)
E
 
Y CDi

= bCDi y
CD
i (r) + (1  bCDi )yCDi (l) (6)
= bCDi

yCDi (r)  yCDi (l)

+ yCDi (l)
where bAi denotes player A's subjective belief that player B will play r, while b
CD
i denotes
players C and D's subjective belief that player B will play r. Player B `lets down' player
A by choosing r if this provides player A with a nal payo yAi (r) below his expectation.
Similarly, player B `lets down' players C and D by choosing r if this provides these players
with a nal payo yCDi (r) below their expectation. Hence, we assume that a player cares
about the extent to which he lets other players down, where GAi (r) and G
CD
i (r) measure
the amount of let down from choosing r. From (2), (3), and (4) it also follows that player
i can only let down player A (or players CD) by choosing the alternative providing A (or
players CD) with his lowest payo.19
So far, the analysis has assumed that player B knows bAi and b
CD
i . In reality, player
B forms expectations (his second-order beliefs) b
A
i = E(b
A
i ) and b
CD
i = E(b
CD
i ) over the
possible values of the rst-order beliefs of the other players. Player B's expected utility
E(Ui(r)) (conditional on the game) can be derived by replacing b
A
i in (5) with E(b
A
i ) and
bCDi in (5) with E(b
CD
i ). The expectation E(Ui(l)) is derived analogously.
20
18We also estimated a model allowing separate guilt from letting down players C and D. The results
are essentially identical to those obtained by grouping players C and D together and led to no signicant
increase in the log-likelihood function.
19For example, if yAi (r) < y
A
i (l), then G
A
i (r) > 0 and G
A
i (l) = 0.
20We do not model the fact that only a random subset of players will be selected to be paid (see Section
2). This omission should have only small eects on our results under the maintained assumption that B
players are risk neutral.
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5 Estimation using stated beliefs
In this section we estimate the model of the previous section using stated second-order
beliefs. As said in the introduction, our estimation framework deals with a possible con-
sensus eect in two dierent ways. First, we estimate our stated belief model combining
data from both treatments and allow estimates of A to dier across treatments. Second,
we explicitly allow for a correlation between stated beliefs and guilt aversion controlling
for one possible source of consensus eect. In our model, this source of consensus eect im-
plies that B players with guilt aversion (i.e. higher values of Ai ) state second-order beliefs
bAi (r) resulting in higher implied levels of G
A
i () of the relevant alternative. Furthermore,
by allowing for dierent estimates of A across the two dierent treatments, we can eval-
uate how much of the dierences in estimated A across both treatments is attributable
to the possible correlation between stated beliefs and guilt aversion in treatment S.
To proceed, we assume that the sensitivity to guilt towards player A is given by
Ai = 
A
SDi + 
A
X(1 Di) + u
A
i (7)
where u
A
i is a normally distributed idiosyncratic component of guilt aversion with mean
zero and variance 2. Di denotes a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for players
in treatment S, and 0 for players in treatment X. Hence, our specication allows the
sensitivity to guilt in treatment to dier from the sensitivity to guilt in treatment X.21
We next model stated second-order beliefs b
A
i in treatment S. Since reported proba-
bilities may well be zero or one, we allow for censoring at 0 and 1, as in a two-limit tobit
model. In particular, we model the stated second-order beliefs as:
where ubi denotes a mean zero normally distributed random variable with variance 
2
b ,
and xi denotes a vector of payos characterizing the game. Note, the model above allows
the unobserved part of guilt aversion u
A
i to aect the stated beliefs in a manner which
is consistent with the consensus hypothesis when  > 0. To see this, consider rst games
21We also estimated a model where we allowed the sensitivity parameters to depend on observable
characteristics of players (age, gender, education, and income). We failed to nd any signicant increase
in the model log-likelihood. Results are available upon request.
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b
A?
i (r) = x
0
i   u
A
i 1[y
A
i (r) < y
A
i (l)] + u
A
i 1[y
A
i (r) > y
A
i (l)] + u
b
i
b
A
i = 0 if b
A?
i < 0
= b
A?
i if 0 < b
A?
i < 1
= 1 if b
A?
i > 1
where playing right provides guilt to player B, that is games such that yAi (r) < y
A
i (l).
Recall that there is no guilt from playing left in this case. Then it follows from (5) that
B-players with relatively higher guilt aversion (higher values of u
A
i ) are more likely to
think that player A expects that a lower proportion of B players will choose r. Hence,
lower values of b
A
i will be stated which (from (3) and (5)) results in higher guilt G
A
i (r)
from choosing r. Next consider games where playing left provides guilt to player B, that
is games such that yAi (r) > y
A
i (l). Recall that there is no guilt from playing right in this
case. Then it follows from (5) that B players with relatively higher guilt aversion (higher
values of u
A
i ) are more likely to think that player A expects that a higher proportion of
B players will choose r. Hence, higher values of b
A
i will be stated which results in higher
guilt GAi (l) from choosing l.
The previous discussion implies that omitting to control for correlation between second-
order beliefs and guilt aversion may lead to a downward bias of the sensitivity parameter
AS , hence an overestimation of the WTP. A formal test of the correlation between guilt
aversion and beliefs can be performed by testing the null hypothesis  = 0 against the
alternative  > 0.
As second-order beliefs of B-players concerning C- and D-players were not elicited, it
will not be possible to estimate CDi . However, it is possible to control for the eect of
guilt towards inactive players when estimating Ai . To do so, we replace (6) into (4) and
(4) into (2). Taking expectations over bAi we get an expression of the expected utility of
player B from choosing r
E(Ui(r)) = y
B
i (r) + 
A
i G
A
i (r) (8)
+CDi (1  b
CD
i )(y
CD
i (l)  yCDi (r))1

yCDi (r) < y
CD
i (l)

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where GAi (r) is now evaluated at b
A
i .
22 Note from (8) that guilt towards inactive players
is a function of a known variable (yCDi (l)  yCDi (r))1

yCDi (r) < y
CD
i (l)

and an unknown
parameter CDi (1  b
CD
i ) which can be estimated.
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Finally, we assume that player B has private information about a part of his utility of
choosing left and of choosing right. We model this by adding "ri to E(Ui(r)) in (8) and
"li to E(Ui(l)) (not presented), where  denotes a scale parameter. We assume that the
unobserved private utilities "ni for n 2 fl; rg are i.i.d across players and choices and follow
a type 1 extreme value distribution.24 The model is estimated using full information
maximum simulated likelihood.25
We estimated a restricted and unrestricted version of the model with stated beliefs.
The restricted model was estimated setting  = 0, thus imposing no correlation between
stated beliefs and preferences. Our unrestricted version of the model consisted of esti-
mating all parameters including , thus allowing for a correlation between guilt aversion
and stated beliefs.
Table 2 presents the results of the restricted and unrestricted versions of the model
using stated beliefs. We discuss rst the results of the restricted model. We nd that
the estimate of AS is -1.430 and highly signicant. The estimated magnitude of 
A
S is
surprisingly large. It suggests that B players are on average willing to pay up to 1.430
Euros to avoid letting down A players by 1 Euro in treatment S. As argued before the
22Note that we implicitly assume risk neutrality, which implies that we can ignore the players risk
which results from choosing to pay out only a randomly selected subset of games.
23Estimating CDi (1  b
CD
i ) as a single parameter implicitly assumes that 
CD
i (1  b
CD
i ) does not vary
across i. We also experimented with a random coecient specication allowing CDi (1   b
CD
i ) to vary
across i. This did not lead to a signication increase in the log-likelihood function value. We thus report
point estimates of CDi (1  b
CD
i ).
24An extension would be to additionally model possible correlation between beliefs and "ni . This would
allow to control for correlation between decisions and beliefs even in the absence of guilt aversion (see
Vanberg (2010) for a discussion).
25Details concerning the log-likelihood function and computation can be found in the appendix of the
paper.
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estimated value of AS in the restricted model could be biased upwards due to correlation
between preferences and stated beliefs. Indirect evidence of such a bias can be seen
from the estimates of AX for treatment X. There, correlation between preferences and
beliefs is zero by construction. We nd that the estimated value of AX is -0.559 and
signicant. Furthermore, we reject the null hypothesis that AS = 
A
X in favor of the
alternative AS < 
A
X (p-value = 0.003). This suggests that WTP estimated in treatment
S is signicantly higher than the corresponding level estimated in treatment X.
The estimated value of CDi (1 b
CD
i ) is negative and insignicant, suggesting weak guilt
aversion from letting down inactive players. The estimated variance of u
A
i is small and
insignicant. Hence, the restricted model predicts that there is no signicant unobserved
heterogeneity in guilt aversion across the population. Concerning the parameters in the
belief equations, we nd that payos enter the equation with the expected signs: B-
players state higher probabilities of choosing r when their own payos of playing right
yB(r) is higher, and lower probabilities when their payos of playing left yB(l) is higher.
We also nd that B-players state signicantly higher probabilities b
A
i of choosing r when
the payo of player A increases when choosing r.
We next discuss results of the unrestricted model. First, note that the estimate of 
is positive and signicant, indicating a signicant correlation between guilt aversion and
stated beliefs. As we discussed above, a positive and signicant estimate of  is consistent
with the presence of a consensus eect. Allowing for this correlation has an important
impact on our main model estimates. In particular, the estimated value of AS increases
to -0.385 and is signicant against the alternative hypothesis that AS < 0 (p-value =
0.064). On the other hand, the estimated value AX is -0.794 and remains signicant.
Moreover, the estimated value of AS is no longer signicantly dierent from the estimated
value of AX (p-value = 0.322) once correlation between preferences and stated beliefs is
accounted for. These results indicate that ignoring the correlation between preferences
and stated beliefs in treatment S leads to a upward bias of the estimated level of WTP.
Quantitatively, our model predicts that B players are on average willing between 0.40 and
0.80 Euros to avoid letting down A players by 1 Euro.
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The estimated parameters of the belief equation in the unrestricted model are similar
to those of the restricted model. In particular, B players state higher probabilities of
choosing r when their payos of playing right yB(r) is higher, and lower probabilities
when their payos of playing left yB(l) is higher. We also nd that B-players state signif-
icantly higher probabilities b
A
i of choosing r when the payo of player A when choosing
r increases. Hence, it seems that B players think that A players will expect them to
take into account their well being when making their decisions. This nding seemingly
contradicts descriptive evidence presented in Section 3. There, our analysis of the beliefs
of A players suggests that A players do not expect that their well-being will be taken into
account by B players. Finally, the estimated value of CDi (1  b
CD
i ) remains negative and
insignicant, suggesting again weak guilt aversion from letting down players C and D.
6 Estimation assuming equilibrium beliefs
In this section we estimate WTP to avoid guilt under the assumption that second-order
beliefs are in equilibrium. As we will discuss below, the assumptions underlying the
equilibrium model appear rejected by the data. Hence, purpose of this section is to
see whether the equilibrium model can provide reasonable estimates of WTP as a rst
approximation.
We do so using only data from treatment S. Estimation of an equilibrium model
using data from treatment S is reasonable given that B players made their decisions in
that treatment before knowing that they later had to state their second-order beliefs.
As a result, decisions in treatment S could not have been inuenced by the subsequent
elicitation of beliefs. We exclude data from treatment X at this point since each B
player in that treatment was provided the rst-order beliefs of player A before making his
decision. As these rst-order beliefs were not restricted to be consistent with the choice
distributions, imposing consistency for estimation of the model parameters in treatment
X would almost surely result in a misspecied model.
To estimate the equilibrium model, we use the following specications of Ai and 
CD
i
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Ai = 
A
S + u
A
i (9)
CDi = 
CD + u
CD
i (10)
where the elements of (9) have been dened previously in (7), CDi denotes the mean of
CDi , and where u
CD
i is a normally distributed idiosyncratic component with mean zero
and variance 2.
26 Contrary to (7), we do not estimate a separate value of  for treatment
X as data of the later treatment is not used in the estimation. Under these assumptions,
the probability pi(r) that player B will play r in a given game given beliefs (b
A
i ; b
CD
i ) is
given by
pi(r) =
Z Z
exp (E(Ui(r))=)
exp(E(Ui(r))=) + exp(E(Ui(l))=)
hA(u
A
i )h
CD(u
CD
i )du
A
i du
CD
i (11)
where the integration is taken over the distributions of u
A
i and u
CD
i and where E(Ui(r))
is given in (8).
To close the model, we assume that beliefs of B players are consistent with the choice
distribution. This restriction implicitly suggests the following assumptions on the infor-
mation sets of the players in the game. First, this model assumes that A, C, and D
players know the distributions of Ai and 
CD
i . They do not know however the exact val-
ues of Ai and 
CD
i of the B player they are matched with. Second, A, C, and D-players
do not know the private component "i(n) of the B player they are matched with, but
they know their population distributions. All other elements of the utility function are
assumed to be known. Hence, A, C and D players can use this information to derive their
rst-order beliefs concerning the behavior of player B. These rst-order beliefs have two
characteristics. First, they are identical across players in the same game (bAi = b
CD
i ) given
all players share the same information set. Second, rst-order beliefs will coincide with
the observed distribution pi(r) given in (11). Finally, B-players are assumed to know all
26Hence we assume that the variances of u
A
i and u
CD
i are identical. Allowing these variances to dier
does not produce signicant increases in the log-likelihood function value (p-value = 0.912).
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this, i.e. they know what A, C, and D-players can infer. Hence, they align their second-
order beliefs with the rst-order beliefs of other players. This generates the following
equilibrium restrictions on beliefs
b
A
i = b
CD
i = pi(r) for all i = 1; 2; :::; N (12)
Note that these restrictions imply that CDi can be identied. This diers from the stated
belief model of Section 5 where only the product CDi (1 b
CD
i ) is identied. Identication
of CDi follows from (8) and the equilibrium restrictions (12) which provide identication
of b
CD
i . Note also that the equilibrium restrictions on beliefs appear to contradict some
of our previous results. In particular, the descriptive evidence in Section 3 suggests that
A players do not expect that B players will take into account the well-being of other
players. On the other hand, estimates of the belief equation in the disequilibrium model
suggest that B-players think that A players will expect them to take into account their
well being when making their decisions. Hence, stated second-order beliefs of B players
do not appear in line with the stated rst-order beliefs of A players. However, note that
these dierences do not a priori imply that results of the equilibrium approach will dier
from those of the disequilibrium approach since stated beliefs of A players are not used
to estimate any of our models.
To estimate our equilibrium model, let di(r) denote a binary decision variable taking
a value of 1 when player i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng chooses r, and 0 otherwise. The model log-
likelihood is given by
QN () =
1
N
NX
i=1
log [di(r)  pi(r) + (1  di(r))  (1  pi(r))] (13)
where  denotes the vector of model parameters. Estimation of  is done iteratively. In
particular, for a given value of , it is simple to solve for the xed point pi(r) for each
player i. Given these xed points, we then update  to maximize (13) given the games
(yAi (l); y
A
i (r); y
B
i (l); y
B
i (r); y
CD
i (l); y
CD
i (r)) : i = 1; 2; :::; N
	
As a result, the xed points are updated iteratively with each new value of  until equation
(13) is maximized.
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Estimates of the equilibrium model are given in the last column of Table 2. We nd
that the estimated value of AS is -0.655 and signicantly dierent from zero. Interestingly,
the estimated value of AS is within the range of estimates obtained using the stated belief
model.27 Furthermore, the estimated guilt aversion towards the inactive players CD is
small and insignicant. This parallels our ndings using the stated belief model and
indicates that we do not loose much by excluding guilt towards inactive players. This
result is in line with earlier experimental research documenting the insensitivity towards
inactive players (see e.g. Guth and van Damme (1998), Kagel and Wolfe (2001)). Finally,
we nd that 2 is positive but imprecisely measured. This suggests that there is no
unobserved heterogeneity in guilt aversion across the population.
7 Conclusion
This paper has focused on estimating the population level of WTP to avoid guilt using
equilibrium and stated belief models of guilt aversion. Our application focused on a simple
game of proposal and response played by a large and representative sample of the Dutch
population.
We found that WTP estimated using stated belief data can be substantially over-
estimated if correlation between stated beliefs and preferences is not accounted for. In
particular, the estimated level of WTP in treatment S was found to be signicantly greater
(by a factor of 3) than the corresponding level estimated in treatment X. However, we
found that the estimated WTP in treatment S was substantially smaller (but remained
signicant) when we controlled for this correlation. In fact, controlling for correlation
between preferences and beliefs produces estimates of WTP in treatment S which are
insignicantly dierent from those obtained in treatment X. These result suggest that
27A formal test of the null hypothesis that WTP using exogenously induced beliefs is equal to WTP
in the equilibrium model is complicated by the fact that the equilibrium model uses only data from
treatment S (the stated belief models uses data from both treatments) and by the fact that both models
are not nested.
20
ignoring correlation between preferences and beliefs can result in important overestima-
tion of WTP when using stated beliefs. Overall, our range of estimates suggests that
responders are on average willing to pay between 0.40 and 0.80 Euro to avoid letting
down proposers by 1 Euro. On the other hand, we fail to nd that players are willing to
pay to avoid letting down inactive players. This result holds for all models estimated.
Interestingly, replacing stated beliefs by equilibrium restrictions produces estimates of
WTP which are signicant and fall into the range of estimates obtained when using ex-
ogenously induced beliefs. We interpret this nding as an indication that the equilibrium
model provides a good rst approximation of the level of WTP in the population even in
one shot games. Future research is needed to investigate whether this result applies to
more general models incorporating second-order beliefs (see Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger,
2004).
Finally, our experimental design shares important similarities with the one used by
Ellingsen, Johannesson, Torsvik and Tjtta (2009). Like them, we exogenously induced
second-order beliefs in our treatment X. Contrary to them however, we nd signicant
WTP to avoid guilt with exogenously induced second-order beliefs. An interesting di-
rection for future research is to examine the factors which can explain this dierence.
Socio-economic and cultural dierences across subject pools are in principle possible ex-
planations. Yet, we found no evidence that guilt aversion varies signicantly across socio-
economic dimensions (e.g. age, education, income) which distinguish our representative
subject pool from student subject pools. This suggests that cultural (or other unobserv-
able) characteristics can possibly account for the dierences in measured guilt aversion
across both populations.
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A Technical appendix
We present here the log-likelihood function of the model with stated beliefs. We observe
for each player in treatment S a choice and a stated belief. Let ci 2 fl; rg denote the
choice of player i, and let b
A
i denote his stated second-order belief concerning the choice
of playing r. Finally, dene xi = f(yji (r); yji (l)) : j 2 fA;B;CDgg as the relevant payo
vector for player i.
Given our model assumptions, it follows that conditional on u
A
i , the likelihood of
observing

ci; b
A
i

is the product of the conditional choice and belief likelihoods
L(ci; b
A
i jxi; u
A
i ) = 1 [ci = l] Pr

ci = ljxi; uAi

F

b
A
i jxi; u
A
i

+1 [ci = r] Pr

ci = rjxi; uAi

F

b
A
i jxi; u
A
i

where
Pr

ci = rjxi; uAi

=
exp (E(Ui(r))=)
exp (E(Ui(r))=) + exp (E(Ui(l))=)
Pr

ci = ljxi; uAi

= 1  Pr

ci = rjxi; uAi

and
F

b
A
i jxi; u
A
i

= 

 x0i+u
A
i 1[yAi (r)<yAi (l)] u
A
i 1[yAi (r)>yAi (l)]
b

, if b
A
i = 0
= f

b
A
i  x0i+u
A
i 1[yAi (r)<yAi (l)] u
A
i 1[yAi (r)>yAi (l)]
b

=b , if 0 < b
A
i < 1
= 

1 x0i+u
A
i 1[yAi (r)<yAi (l)] u
A
i 1[yAi (r)>yAi (l)]
b

, if b
A
i = 1;
where  () and f () denote respectively the standard normal cumulative and density
functions. The likelihood contribution of player i is obtained by integrating out over the
distribution of u
A
i
L(ci; b
A
i jxi) =
Z
L(ci; b
A
i jxi; u
A
i )h

u
A
i

du
A
i (14)
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where h () denotes the normal density function with mean zero and variance 2. For
players in the treatment X, beliefs are assumed exogenous. Hence, their likelihood con-
tribution is simply their conditional choice probability
L(cijxi) =
Z
L(cijxi; uAi )h

u
A
i

du
A
i (15)
=
Z h
1 [ci = l] Pr

ci = ljxi; uAi

+ 1 [ci = r] Pr

ci = rjxi; uAi
i
h

u
A
i

du
A
i
The sample log-likelihood is given by
1
N
NX
i=1

log

L(ci; b
A
i jxi)

Ti + log (L(cijxi)) [1  Ti]

where Ti is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when player i took part in treatment
X, and 0 otherwise. Given no closed form solution exists to this integrals in (14) and
(15), a numerical approximation must be performed. In the paper, we approximate the
likelihood contribution by simulation. In particular, we approximate (14) and (15) using
the following simulators
eL(ci; bAi jxi) = 1R
RX
r=1
L(ci; b
A
i jxi; u
A
i;r )
eL(cijxi) = 1
R
RX
r=1
L(cijxi; uAi;r )
where
n
u
A
i;r : r = 1; :::; R
o
denotes a sequence of R draws taken from the distribution
h

u
A
i

. Sequences are randomly drawn for each of the N players in the experiment.
We use Halton draws to lower the simulation noise of the estimator (see Train (2003) for
details).
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Treatment S Treatment X
x y(l) y(r) x y(l) y(r)
Player A 24.935 20.634 20.617 24.648 19.683 21.441
(9.978) (16.750) (16.416) (9.900) (16.778) (16.491)
Player B 24.860 22.498 21.511 24.851 24.420 19.904
(7.806) (17.703) (17.138) (8.022) (17.574) (16.964)
Player C 25.102 20.782 20.449 25.250 19.920 21.575
(2.194) (16.393) (16.120) (2.039) (16.722) (16.780)
Player D 25.102 21.327 21.250 25.250 19.918 21.855
(2.194) (16.683) (16.768) (2.039) (15.826) (16.717)
Table 1: Sample mean and standard deviations of the payos of players in treatments
S (N = 1078) and X (N = 540). Entries are measured in Euros. The minimum and
maximum payos for y(l) and y(r) are 0 and 50 Euros respectively for both players and
in both treatments. The minimum and maximum payos for the outside option x are 10
and 40 Euros for players A and B in both treatments, and 20 and 30 Euros for players C
and D in both treatments.
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Figure 1: Left graph: deviations between stated rst-order beliefs of A players and the
estimated choice probability of B players (N = 214). Right graph: deviations between
the stated second-order beliefs of B players and the estimated expected rst-order beliefs
of A players (N = 1078).
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Stated beliefs Equilibrium beliefs
Restricted ( = 0) Unrestricted (b = 0:042)
Preference parameters
AS -1.430*** -0.385* -0.655***
(0.224) (0.253) (0.167)
CD (see note) -0.025 -0.026 -0.006
(0.078) (0.080) (0.205)
AX -0.559*** -0.794*** -
(0.215) (0.304)
 3.360*** 3.022*** 3.138***
(0.258) (0.238) (0.087)
2 0.002 5.749** 1.733
(0.111) (2.351) (1.613)
Belief parameters
yA(r) 0.012** 0.013**
(0.005) (0.005)
yA(l) -0.000 -0.022***
(0.005) (0.005)
yB(r) 0.071*** 0.067***
(0.005) (0.005)
yB(l) -0.066*** -0.061***
(0.005) (0.005)
xA -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
2b 0.072*** 0.054***
(0.003) (0.004)
Constant 0.491*** 0.484***
(0.038) (0.035)
Log-likelihood -1136.910 -1108.500 -664.339
Table 2: Estimated parameters of the stated and equilibrium belief models. Estimates of
the stated belief model (restricted and un-restricted versions) are obtained using decisions
and beliefs from treatments S (N=1078) and X (N=540). Estimates of the equilibrium
model are obtained using only the decisions in treatment X (N=540). Asymptotic stan-
dard errors are in parenthesis. Estimates for the stated belief model presented under
the heading CD correspond to estimates of CDi (1   b
CD
i ). See section 5 for details.
'*','**','***' denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Signicance of
AS , 
A
X , and 
CD are based one one-sided alternatives (eg. AS < 0). Estimates are based
on 1078 and 540 B-players in treatments S and X.
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